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TREATMENT OF POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER




F OR THREE-QUARTERS of a century, the liability of air car-
riers for accidents causing bodily injury that occur during in-
ternational air transportation has been governed by a treaty
known as the Warsaw Convention.1 The limits of air carrier lia-
bility for bodily injury under Article 17 of the Convention are
outlined in a series of important Supreme Court decisions that
define the terms "accident" and "bodily injury" and declare the
Convention the sole remedy for injuries occurring in interna-
tional air transportation.2 Lower court decisions have further
defined the limits of recovery for bodily injury under the
Convention.
* B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 1970; M.B.A., University of Southern
California, 1973; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 1978. He is a
member of the American Board of Trial Advocates, a certified civil trial advocate
of the National Board of Trial Advocacy, and a member of the International
Association of Defense Counsel. He is a partner in the San Diego office of
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aviation, product liability, and toxic tort cases.
** B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 1989; M.S., Massachusetts Institute
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I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49
U.S.C. § 40105 (West 2001) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention or Convention].
2 Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985) (defining "accident" under Article
17); E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991) (defining "bodily injury"
under Article 17); El AI Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 180-81 (1999)
(precluding personal injury action based on local law when claim does not satisfy
conditions of liability under the Warsaw Convention).
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Recently, these U.S. courts have been confronted with claims
under the Warsaw Convention that a psychological disorder
known as Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) constitutes
"bodily injury" within the meaning of Article 17. These claims
are fed by developments in medicine's understanding of physio-
logical changes to the body related to PTSD.
This paper briefly reviews the psychophilosophical history of
psychosomatic 3 disorders and the history of the development of
PTSD as a diagnostic category of psychological disorders. We
review the development of the definition of "bodily injury"
under Article 17 of the Convention and analyze the judicial
treatment of PTSD claims under United States case law. The
paper concludes with a discussion of potential changes to air
carrier liability for PTSD claims as a result of the recent entry
into force of the Montreal Convention on November 4, 2003,
replacing the air carrier liability framework of the Warsaw
Convention.4
II. PSYCHOSOMATIC DISORDERS AND PTSD
A. PSYCHOSOMATIC DISORDERS - THE MIND/BODY DICHOTOMY
The view that there is a separation in the human person be-
tween the mind and the body dates from the history of Western
thought to Platonic dualism. Plato's dualist theory holds that
there are actually two different worlds: the physical world of ap-
pearances and the higher world of intelligible Forms.5 For
Plato, human beings live in a visible world of the sensible or
physical and the invisible world of the intelligible or abstract. 6
This Platonic dualism was carried forward into a similar separa-
tion in the human person between mind and body.7
Early Judeo-Christian writings recognized a division between
the physical and spiritual aspects of man. For example, Biblical
"Psychosomatic medicine is an area of scientific investigation concerned with
the relation between psychological factors and physiological phenomena in gen-
eral and disease pathogenesis in particular." 2 BENJAMINJ. SADOCK & VIRGINIA A.
SADOCK, KAPLAN & SADOCK'S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1765 (7th
ed. 2000).
4 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 1999 WL 33292734 (2000) [here-
inafter Montreal Convention].
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stories of Job's mental and physical trials to test his faithfulness,'
Jesus's exorcism of spirits from the physical being of the tor-
mented," and Paul's writings to the first-century Christian
churches teaching the distinction between the body and the
spirit" stand witness to the general acceptance of the notion of
a conceptual divide between the realms of the body and the
mind. The early Christian church fathers continued this dual-
istic view of the world. Augustine of Hippo's Confessions traced
his own movement from a life focused on the physical and the
temptation of the flesh to a life focused on the spiritual and the
contemplation of the divine." Thomas Aquinas believed that
man's spirit and natural body were distinguishable, but were
twin aspects of a united whole, with the soul representing man's
basic nature, and the body composing man's matter. "
In the 17th Century, Ren6 Descartes gave dualism and the
mind-body dichotomy a renewed impetus. 13 Descartes argued
that reality is made up exclusively of spirit and matter, and that
these two substances meet only in the human soul.'4 Descartes
acknowledged that when the mind and body interacted, this in-
teraction of affective states caused bodily conditions that were
"somatic." 15
Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic formulations and theories
began to define the interaction between human mental and
physical conditions. Freud confirmed the role of psychological
factors in causing and determining physical manifestations, such
as conversion reactions resulting in paralysis and blindness.16
Prot6ges of Freud, such as Sandor Ferenczi, applied the notion
of confirmed conversion phenomenon to the autonomic ner-
vous system and used Freud's theory to explain such diseases as
ulcerative colitis.' 7 Over time, these theories developed to de-
scribe the integration of the mind and body as an interactive
whole. Walter Cannon, for example, was one of the first scien-
8 Job 30:16-31 (King James).
9 See, e.g., Mark 5:1-17 (King James).
It See, e.g., 1 Corinthians 15 (King James).
11 AUGUSTINE OF Hippo, CONFESSIONS 207-52 (R.S. Pine-Coffin trans., Penguin
Books 1961) (A.D. 397).
12 TARNAS, supra note 5, at 182.
13 Id. at 276.
14 Id. at 278; Theodore M. Brown, Cartesian Dualism and Psychosomatics, 30 Psy-
chosomatics 322 (1989).
15 SADOCK, supra note 3, at 1766-67.
16 Id. at 1766.
17 Id.
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tists to demonstrate the physiological effects of emotional states
and to study the influence of the autonomic nervous system in
modulating such responses.18 Although there is no generally ac-
cepted theoretical framework for a neurobiological basis for
human emotion, neurobiological research may someday provide
an integrated theory that emotion is comprised of bioelectrical
signals in the brain that are mediated by chemical
neurotransmitters.19
Modern medicine has attempted, through psychosomatic-psy-
chobiological research, to delineate the mechanisms by which
experiences, although causing no immediate physical injury,
cause certain types of physiological reactions that result in dis-
ease states.2 ° Physical correlates of human emotional responses
in the form of activation of the sympathetic and parasympa-
thetic nervous systems, including adrenergic and adrenocortical
responses that cause the release of powerful hormones in the
body, are well documented' in the medical literature. 21 The
human body's physical response to the over-activation of these
systems, from exposure to extreme stress, can include hyperten-
sion, coronary artery disease, gastrointestinal conditions, and
22psychoneuroimmunological responses.
Historically, short-term and long-term psychological and phys-
iological responses to life-threatening events producing extreme
stress have not been well understood. However, severe psycho-
logical stressors that include traumatic events, such as violent
assaults, serious accidents and combat situations, are now viewed
as having the potential to cause a diagnosable disorder called
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.
B. PTSD - CHARACTERIZATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Following a severe trauma, any number of psychiatric illnesses
may develop. 21 One of these illnesses is Posttraumatic Stress Dis-
order (PTSD), first introduced into the official classification of
psychiatric disorders in 1980.24 The American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation's (APA) third Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
18 Id.
19 See Mary L. Phillips, et al., Neurobiology of Emotion Perception I: The Neural Basis
of Normal Emotion Perception, 54 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 504-13 (2003).
20 SADOCK, supra note 3, at 1769.
21 Id. at 1770.
22 Id. at 1770-74.
23 See generally L. KEISER, THE TRAUMATIC NEUROSIS 42 (1968).
24 Id. at 198-99.
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Mental Disorders (DSM-III) included, for the first time, a diag-
nosis for PTSD: a mental disturbance that originates in re-
sponse to an overwhelming encounter with severe trauma.2 '
This marked the beginning of serious contemporary research
on the psychiatric and physiologic response to traumatic
events.
26
Despite the relatively recent classification of PTSD as a mental
disorder, stress reactions to trauma are not a newly recognized
phenomenon. The effects of extreme stress have been chroni-
cled for centuries. The psychological effects of war on combat-
ants have been documented as far back as the American
Revolutionary War. 7 A substantial number of veterans from the
World Wars, the Korean Conflict, and the Vietnam Conflict
have experienced psychological symptoms that medicine has
characterized as "shell shock," "combat fatigue," and "stress re-
action."2 The APA's first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders in 1952 (DSM-I) included the classification of
gross stress reaction, compelled by the prevalence of war-related
psychiatric disease.2 9 While recognizing that exposure to ex-
treme stress may induce significant psychological distress, the
DSM-I did not provide operational criteria for formulating a
gross stress reaction diagnosis."
In the mid-1970s, the observation of a large number of com-
bat-related stress disorders in Vietnam veterans prompted in-
creased awareness and analysis of psychological problems
arising in the wake of traumatic experiences. 1 The resulting
research led investigators to postulate that there was a common
pattern of psychic reaction to traumatic events, and that a
method of categorization was needed."2 When PTSD was finally
25 James Carrol, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as an Insanity Defense in Vermont, 9
VT. L. RFv. 69, 71 (1984).
2 For a general discussion of the development of the diagnosis of PTSD, see
49 Am. Jur. POF 2d Post-Traumatic Stress § 73 (2004).
27 Id. (citing Dr. Benjamin Rush, Results of Observation, 7 LONDON MED.J. 77, 79
(1786) (reporting on soldiers returning from battle in apparent good health
later experiencing "fevers," "sleeplessness," and "convulsions")).
•28 See, e.g., Peter C. Erlinder, Paying the Price for Vietnam, 25 B.C. L. RE\. 305,
310 (1984); P. BOURNE, MEN, STRESS AND VIETNAM, 10-22 (1970); SADOCK, supra
note 3, at 1841.
29 Pos'-rI R\uMATIC STRESS DISORDER: A COMPREHENSIVE TExT 3 (Phillip A. Saigh
& J. Douglas Bremer eds., 1998).
30 Id.
31 POsT-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BILocIC-'\L SEQUE-
LAE 60 (Bessel A. Van Der Kolk ed., 1984).
,2 M. HOROWITZ, STRESS RE.SPONSE SYNDROMES (Jason Aronson ed., 1976).
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incorporated into DSM-III in 1980, for the first time, there were
distinct diagnostic criteria for trauma-related stress disorder."
The current diagnostic features for PTSD are contained in
the APA's fourth Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV-TR):
The essential feature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder is the de-
velopment of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an
extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience
of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious
injury, or other threat to one's physical integrity; or witnessing an
event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integ-
rity of another person; or learning about unexpected or violent
death, serious harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by
a family member or other close associate (Criterion Al). The
person's response to the event must involve intense fear, help-
lessness or horror (or in children the response must involve dis-
organized or agitated behavior) (Criterion A2). The
characteristic symptoms resulting from the exposure to the ex-
treme trauma include persistent reexperiencing of the traumatic
event (Criterion B); persistent avoidance of stimuli associated
with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (Crite-
rion C); and persistent symptoms of increased arousal (Criterion
D). The full symptom picture must be present for more than
one month (Criterion E), and the disturbance must cause clini-
cally significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or
other important areas of functioning (Criterion F)."
There are several key aspects to the required diagnostic fea-
tures for PTSD that directly bear on the ability of passengers to
recover damages for "bodily injury" under Article 17 of the War-
saw Convention. First, an essential feature of the disorder is "de-
velopment of characteristic symptoms following exposure. 3 5
The DSM-IV criteria explicitly recognize that symptoms follow
exposure to trauma, and do not occur contemporaneously with
exposure? 6 Second, the diagnosis is based on a "person's re-
sponse to the event" and must involve "intense fear, helpless-
ness, or horror. "'3 The diagnostic criteria speak in terms of
response to psychological stressors, and do not require an ob-
servable physical injury as a predicate to diagnosis of the disor-
33 Id.
34 DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 309.81, 463-
65 (4th ed. 2000).
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der." Third, the characteristic symptoms resulting from the
traumatic event include "persistent reexperiencing," "persistent
avoidance of stimuli," and "persistent symptoms of increased
arousal," that must be present for more than a month.' This
group of symptoms involves delayed psychological response to a
traumatic event--an important consideration in determining
whether PTSD may constitute a "bodily injury" under the War-
saw Convention.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF "BODILY
INJURY' UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention, formally known as the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air,40 is the product of two international con-
ferences--the first held in Paris in 1925 and the second in War-
saw in 1929. 41 The Convention is an international agreement
that governs the rights and responsibilities of passengers, ship-
pers, and carriers in certain aspects of international air transpor-
tation.42 The document was drafted while the airline industry
was still in its infancy and was designed to make it easier for
carriers to obtain insurance and financial backing from inves-
tors by creating a uniform liability scheme, while balancing the
interests of the passengers and the airlines." The Convention
created a presumption of air carrier liability for personal injury
but also contained strict limits on that liability. 44
Since the Warsaw Convention was opened for signature in
1929, it has been criticized for its severe monetary limitation on
i8 Id.
39 Id.
40 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1.
41 Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, 360 F.3d 366, 370 (2d Cir. 2004). The original sig-
natories to the Warsaw Convention are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxemborg, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom. See International Civil Aviation Organization Treaty
Collection, http://w-ww.icao.int/icao/en/leb/treaty.htm (last visited Sept. 14,
2005).
42 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1.
43 In re Korean Air Lines, 932 F.2d 1475, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing E. Air-
lines Inc., v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 546 (1991)) ("[T]he contracting states in 1929
believed that limitations on liability would promote the development of the
fledgling commercial air industry by allowing the airlines to predict their expo-
sure to monetary damages and thereby obtain needed capital and adequate in-
surance coverage.")
44 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 546.
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the amount of a carrier's liability to injured passengers.45 This
criticism has resulted in several amendments and private carrier
agreements to raise or remove limits on carrier liability. These
modifications include the Hague Protocol of 1955, the Montreal
Inter-carrier Agreement of 1966, the Guatemala City Protocol of
1971, the Montreal Protocols of 1975, and the Inter-carrier
Agreements of 1997.46 Each of these modifications sought to
improve passenger recovery under the Convention and expand
carrier liability.4 7 After decades of effort by the United States to
expand carrier liability, the seventy-year-old Warsaw Convention
ultimately was replaced by the Montreal Convention, which
eliminated limitations on carrier liability. 48 While the monetary
limits on passenger recovery for wounding, death, or other bod-
ily injury have increased over time or been eliminated alto-
gether, the conditions under which an international air carrier
may be held liable have remained largely unchanged.
A. ARTICLE 17 OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION - THE
CONDITIONS FOR LIABILITY
The cause of action for wounding, death, or other bodily in-
jury created by the Warsaw Convention is set forth in Article 17.
Article 17 in the original French text reads as follows:
Le transporteur est responsible du dommage survenu en cas de
mort, de blessure ou de toute autre lesion corporelle subie par
un voyageur lorsque l'accident qui a caus6 le dommage s'est
produit a bord de l'adronef ou au cours de toutes opdrations
d'embarquement et de d~barquement.49
The English translation of the authentic French text, as rati-
fied by the United States Senate in 1934, provides:
The. carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
45' Id' (providing for an initial maximum for recovery of $8,300 for an
accident).
46 For a discussion of the history of modifications to the liability limits of the
Warsaw Convention, see 1 LEE S. KREINDLER, AvIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION
§10.02 (1994).
47 Id.
48 Montreal Convention, supra note 4.
49 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17(1). The only authentic text of
the Convention is in the French language. SeeAir Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. at 392, 397
(1985).
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so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. 51
Thus, under Article 17, an air carrier is liable for passenger
injury only when three conditions are satisfied: (1) there has
been an accident in which, (2) the passenger suffered bodily
injury, and (3) the accident took place on board the aircraft or
in the course of operations of embarking or disembarking.5
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S WARSAW CONVENTION TRILOGY
1. Air France v. Saks - The "Accident" Requirement
The Supreme Court first developed a framework for interpret-
ing the meaning of Article 17 in Air France v. Saks, in construing
the meaning of the term "accident. '5' The Supreme Court be-
gan with an analysis of the authentic French text of the treaty
and the context in which the written words were used. 53 The
Court then went on to consider the history of the treaty, the
negotiations among the representatives, and the practical con-
struction adopted by the parties in order to give the words of the
treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the
contracting parties.54  Under this framework, the Supreme
Court determined that an "accident" occurs when a passenger's
injury is "caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happen-
ing that is external to the passenger ' 55 and not from "the pas-
senger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and
expected operation of the aircraft.
56
2. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd - The "Physical Injury"
Requirement
Six years later, the Supreme Court considered the meaning of
the term "16sion corporelle" in Article 17, parsing the meaning
of the phrase "autre 1sion corporelle subie par un voyageur,"
translated into English as "other bodily injury suffered by a pas-
senger. ' 57 In 1991, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd to resolve a conflict between lower
5) Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17(1).
51 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1991).
5' 470 U.S. 392, 395 (1985).
53 1(1. at 398-400.
54 Id. at 400-03.
55 hd. at 405.
56 Id. at 406.
57 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991).
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courts on whether purely psychic trauma is compensable under
Article 17 as a "bodily injury. '58 The Supreme Court held that
"Article 17 does not allow recovery for purely mental injuries. 5 9
In Floyd, an Eastern Airlines flight, en route from Miami to the
Bahamas, lost its three engines shortly after takeoff.60 The crew
announced the plane would be ditched in the ocean, but then
managed to restart one engine and land the plane safely at
Miami. 61 As a consequence of this ordeal, multiple plaintiffs al-
leged severe and permanent mental pain and anguish and
sought recovery under Article 17.62
Following the analytical structure developed in Saks, the Su-
preme Court first considered the legal meaning of the term "l-
sion corporelle" by reference to bilingual French-English
dictionaries, French legislation, French judicial decisions,
French legal treatises and scholarly writing covering the period
leading up to the Warsaw Convention. 6 None of these materi-
als indicated that "lesion corporelle" should be translated other
than "bodily injury," thus excluding purely psychic injury.64
However, because a broader interpretation of "lesion
corporelle" was plausible, and the term is both ambiguous and
difficult to interpret, the Court looked to additional sources.65
The Court next considered the negotiating history of the
Convention and Article 17 in particular.66 The initial proposal
for Article 17, offered at Paris in 1925, contained broad lan-
guage holding carriers liable for an accident.67 This language
was narrowed by adding the phrase "in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury" to the final
version drafted in 1929.68 The Court concluded that it was rea-
sonable to infer that the narrow language was adopted to limit
the types of recoverable injuries.6 9 Furthermore, the unavaila-
bility of compensation for purely psychic injury in many com-
mon and civil law countries at the time the Warsaw Convention
58 Id.
59 Id. at 534.
- Id. at 533.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 535-42.




68 Id. at 543-44.
69 Id. at 543.
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was signed persuaded the Court that the signatories had no spe-
cific intent to include such a remedy in the Convention."' A
narrow reading of the term "lesion corporelle," excluding
purely mental injury, is also consistent with the primary purpose
of the contracting parties to the Convention: limiting the liabil-
ity of air carriers in order to foster the growth of the fledgling
commercial aviation industry.7' The Supreme Court concluded
"that an air carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17 when
an accident has not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical
injury, or physical manifestation of injury. '7 2 The Court specifi-
cally declined to decide "whether passengers can recover for
mental injuries that are accompanied by physical injuries. 73
The Court's concluding remarks, taken in combination with
the exercise of judicial restraint in declining to decide an issue
not squarely presented by the case before it, spawned inconsis-
tent lower court decisions concerning the ability of claimants to
recover damages for emotional injury accompanying but not
caused by physical injury. Uncertainty about whether passen-
gers can recover for mental injuries accompanied but not
caused by physical injuries or for mental injuries that are accom-
panied by physical manifestations, largely was removed by the
Supreme Court's decision in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng.74
3. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng - The "Exclusive Remedy"
Limitation
In El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether Article 17 provides the exclusive remedy for pas-
senger injuries, thereby precluding state law claims. 75 The
plaintiff in Tseng was subjected to an intrusive security search
prior to boarding an El Al Israel Airlines flight from New York to
Tel Aviv.7" The plaintiff alleged psychic or psychosomatic inju-
ries, but no bodily injury. 77 The Court found that the Conven-
tion precludes an action under local law when a passenger's
claim fails to satisfy Article 17's conditions for liability because
70 Id. at 544-45.
71 Id. at 546.
72 Id. at 552.
73 Id.
74 525 U.S. 155, 172 (1999).
75 Id. at 156.
76 Id. at 155.
77 Id.
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either it entails no "bodily injury" or was not the result of an
"accident."78
In dicta, the Supreme Court stated that even if an accident
occurred, Tseng would be unable to recover under the treaty
because "she sustained no 'bodily injury' and could not gain
compensation under Article 17 for her solely psychic or psycho-
somatic injuries. ''7  The injuries claimed by Tseng included
"headaches, upset stomach, ringing in the ears, nervousness and
sleeplessness" as a consequence of a search carried out by secur-
ity officers.8 0 These injuries were physical manifestations of
emotional injury.fl The Supreme Court noted its own "physical
manifestation of injury" language in Floyd,8 2 but did not disturb
the district court's finding that these injuries simply did not con-
stitute "bodily injury" under Article 17 of the convention."
C. LOWER COURT DECISIONS CONSIDERING EMOTIONAL
INJURY RECOVERY
Since the Supreme Court's trio of decisions in Saks, Floyd, and
Tseng, the lower courts have been consistent in finding no liabil-
ity under Article 17 for emotional injury when an accident has
not caused a passenger to suffer a physical injury, but inconsis-
tent in finding liability when emotional injury accompanies an
actual physical injury, but is not caused by it, or when emotional
injury is manifested in physical injury.84
1. Emotional Injury Absent Physical Injury
Following the Supreme Court's holding in Floyd, courts gener-
ally have found that emotional injury to a passenger without
physical injury is not actionable under Article 17. For example,
in Fishman v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff attempted to assert
purely emotional distress claims under state law in order to
avoid the bar to such claims under Article 17 of the Warsaw
78 Id. at 160.
79 Id. at 172.
80 Tseng v. El A] Isr. Airlines, 919 F. Supp. 155, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
81 Id. at 158.
82 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 171.
83 Tseng, 919 F. Supp. at 160.
84 See John F. Easton et al., Post Traumatic "Lesion Corporelle": A Continuum of
Bodily Injury Under the Warsaw Convention, 68 J. AIR L. & CoM. 665 (2003). For a
summary and analysis of the judicial landscape of recovery for emotional injuries
under the Warsaw Convention, see also Shannon C. Kief, Recovery for Emotional
and Mental Injury Under Warsaw Convention, 196 A.L.R. FED. 221 (2004).
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Convention.85 The Fishman case arose out of an incident aboard
a Delta Airlines flight from Tel Aviv to New York with a stopover
in Paris.8" During descent into Paris, one of plaintiffs children
experienced ear pain.87 A flight attendant suggested that a cup
containing a warm cloth be placed over the child's ear to relieve
the pain." When the suggestion was followed and the cup was
placed over the child's ear, scalding water dripped on the
child's neck and shoulder, causing burns.8" The mother filed
suit against Delta Airlines under New York law for negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress and on an implied
cause of action under a federal aviation regulation requiring the
maintenance of first-aid kits for the protection of airline
passengers. °
Because the case was decided before the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Tseng was handed down, the Second Circuit first was
required to consider whether Article 17 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion preempted state or federal law claims not based upon the
treaty. 1 The court concluded that the emotional harm claims
of the plaintiff were subject to Article 17 because the claims
arose from an accident in the course of international air trans-
port. 9 2 The court then relied upon the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Floyd and its own holding in Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines,
Ltd.'-" to find that the plaintiff could not recover for purely emo-
tional distress.94
In Croucher v. Worldwide Flight Servs., Inc., in an effort to take
the claims out of the ambit of the Warsaw Convention, a plain-
tiff attempted to attribute her emotional distress claims to a
cleaning crew's negligence before an international flight.15 A pas-
senger traveling onboard Korean Airlines from Newark to Seoul
came in contact with an air sickness bag containing fluid left in
the bag from a passenger on a previous flight. " The minimal
amount of fluid left in the air sickness bag was tested in Korea
85 132 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 1998).




9') Id. at 141.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 142.
93 Id. (citing Tseng v. El Al Isr. Airlines, 122 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1997)).
94 Fishman, 132 F.3d at 142.
95 111 F. Supp. 2d 501, 502 (D.N.J. 2000).
96 Id.
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for the presence of human immunovirus (HIV) and Hepatitis B
virus (HBV) and was found to be negative.9 7 The passenger was
tested for HlV and HBV on a series of occasions thereafter with
negative results.9 Nevertheless, the passenger sued the airline
for negligence in the ground-handling services in failing to
clean the cabin and clear waste.9 9 Although there was no physi-
cal injury, the plaintiff claimed severe emotional distress and
mental anxiety.100
In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court deter-
mined that the plaintiffs exposure to waste in the air sickness
bag was the result of services provided by a carrier pursuant to
Article 1 (2) of the Warsaw Convention and that the incident oc-
curred onboard the aircraft during an international flight."0 '
The court, relying on Floyd, then determined that plaintiff's
emotional distress and anxiety failed to constitute a "bodily in-
jury" within the meaning of Article 17.102 Therefore, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the airline. 10 3
An effort to style emotional distress damages as "inconve-
nience" damages in order to avoid the "bodily injury" definition
of Article 17 was unsuccessful in Lee v. American Airlines, Inc." 4
In that case, the carrier brought a motion for partial summary
judgment in a putative class action brought by the plaintiff on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated who were ticketed
on an international flight from New York's JFK International
Airport to London's Heathrow International Airport. 05 Depar-
ture was delayed, and ultimately canceled, placing the passen-
gers in very inconvenient and uncomfortable circumstances.'0 6
The claim, brought under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention
for damages occasioned by delay in the transportation of air pas-
sengers, asserted damages to the plaintiff for his "inconve-
nience" in being "trapped in a 'holding area' without adequate
food, water, and restroom facilities," "being forced to spend the
night in substandard, dirty and unsafe motels," "being subjected




100 Id. at 502.
101 Id. at 506.
102 Id. at 506-07 (citing E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991)).
103 Id. at 507.
104 No. CIV.A. 301CV1179P, 2002 WL 1461920 (N.D. Tex. July 2, 2002).
105 Id. at *1.
106 Id.
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representatives," "being required ... to obtain alternative means
of transportation," and "loss of a refreshing and memorable
vacation."..7
The airline argued that the plaintiffs "inconvenience" dam-
ages were not damages for delay under Article 19 at all, but
rather disguised claims for emotional distress that were not per-
mitted under Article 17.1'0 Plaintiff acknowledged that damages
for emotional distress, absent physical injury, were not available
under the Warsaw Convention but argued that the damages he
was seeking to recover were quantifiable and were a type of eco-
nomic loss recoverable under Article 19.1' 9 The court analyzed
plaintiff's "inconvenience" damages pleaded in the complaint
and determined that they fell under the rubric of "mental inju-
ries."' 1l The type of damages pleaded was not easily quantifiable
and did not result in real economic losses, but rather in mental
anguish."' After re-characterizing the plaintiff's damages as
non-economic in nature, the court granted the motion for sum-
mary judgment in favor of the airline, relying on the Floyd
decision.' 12
Thus, cases asserting a right to recover under the Warsaw
Convention for emotional injuries, absent a physical injury, have
been rejected by courts since the Supreme Court's decision in
Floyd, irrespective of the plaintiffs' characterization of the
claims.
2. Emotional Injury Accompanied by Physical Injury or Manifested
in Physical Injury
After Floyd, courts have not been nearly as uniform in decid-
ing cases where a passenger alleges emotional injury as a result
of an accident occurring in international air travel and has ei-
ther alleged a companion physical injury that is not the cause of
the emotional injury, or has alleged physical injury as a manifes-
tation of emotional injury. Most cases decided after Floyd re-
quire that the emotional injury be the product of the physical
injury for the emotional damages to be recoverable. A few cases
require only a predicate physical injury or manifestation of a
physical injury in order for such damages to be recoverable.





112 Id. at *5.
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a. Majority View - Emotional Injury Flowing from Physical
Injury
The majority of courts following Floyd have found that recov-
ery for emotional injury is permitted only if it "flows from" a
bodily injury. 1 3 This position was initially articulated in Jack v.
Trans World Airlines,'14 a case decided by the Northern District of
California three years after Floyd. In Jack, passengers suffered
minor physical injuries and emotional distress following an
aborted takeoff and subsequent evacuation of a Trans World
Airlines flight. 15 The district court considered several ap-
proaches to the question of whether the plaintiffs could hold
the carrier liable under the Warsaw Convention for mental inju-
ries that were not caused by bodily injuries. 1 6 The Jack court
concluded on summary judgment that damages for emotional
distress are allowed only for distress that flows from a bodily in-
jury, reasoning that it would prevent inequities among the pas-
sengers, in that "[t] he happenstance of getting scratched on the
way down the evacuation slide [did] not enable one passenger
to obtain a substantially greater recovery than that of an un-
scratched co-passenger who was equally terrified by the plane
crash." '17 Under this approach, a plaintiff can recover for emo-
tional distress caused by and flowing from a physical injury, but
not for the emotional distress caused by and flowing from the
accident itself.118
In Rothschild v. Tower Air, Inc., the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania considered this issue in the context of a post-trial mo-
tion. 1 9 Rothschild, a passenger on a flight from Tel Aviv to
New York, received a puncture wound to her right index finder
from a hypodermic needle when she reached into the magazine
pouch adjacent to her seat. 20 The plaintiffs husband also
113 See, e.g., In reAir Crash at Little Rock, Ark., on June 1, 1999, 291 F.3d 503,
509 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 974 (2002);Jack v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Wencelius v. Air Fr., Inc., No. SACV-95-
389-AHS, 1996 WL 866122, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 1996); Longo v. Air Fr., No.
95-CV-0292-BDP, 1996 WL 866124, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1996).
114 854 F. Supp. 654, 668 (N.D. Cal. 1994). The Jack decision is generally iden-
tified as the mainstream view on this issue. See Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, 360 F.3d
366, 376 (2d Cir. 2004); see also In re Air Crash at Little Rock, 291 F.3d at 509.
115 Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 657.
116 Id. at 665.
117 Id. at 668.
118 Id.
1l9 No. CIV.A. 94-2656, 1995 WL 71053, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 1995).
120 Id.
444
POS7YRA UMA TIC STRESS
claimed loss of consortium damages.' The jury returned a ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $10,000, but in
favor of the defendants on the husband's loss of consortium
claim.'12 In post-trial motions, the plaintiff contended that the
court erred in granting defendants' motion in limine to preclude
her from introducing any testimony concerning her fear of con-
tracting AIDS or Hepatitis from the needle prick. 21
The court, relying on Floyd, stated that passengers may not
recover for purely emotion injuries but may only recover for
mental injuries that are accompanied by physical injuries. 124
The court noted that while Ms. Rothschild suffered a physical
injury, the needle prick, she was not entitled to recover for all
emotional distress that occurred as a result, but only the emo-
tional distress related to and flowing from her physical injury. 12 5
The court noted that any emotional distress related to fear of
contracting AIDS or Hepatitis was unrelated to the needle prick
because she could not show any exposure to those diseases and
permitting a recovery under these circumstances would be
purely speculative. 1 2 1
A year later, the Southern District of New York considered
this issue in Longo v. Air France on a Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claims for mental
injury.1 7 The Longos were traveling aboard Air France on their
honeymoon and were ticketed round-trip between New York
and Tahiti.12 8 The Air France aircraft on which they were travel-
ing landed long and skidded off the runway into the ocean. 9
All of the passengers evacuated into the water by emergency
slides.""° Ms. Longo bruised her thigh during the landing and
stepped on a sea urchin during evacuation. 31 Mr. Longo





15 Id. at *2.
126 Id.
127 No. 95-CV-0292-BDP, t996 NAL 866124, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1996).
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suffered mental injuries in that they were apprehensive of death
before the crash and were later afraid to fly.' 33
Citing Floyd, the district court held that Article 17 of the Con-
vention "did not allow recovery for purely mental injuries be-
cause" such "injuries were not encompassed in the term bodily
injury. "134 The court carefully parsed the language of Floyd that
appeared to leave open the question whether emotional distress
is compensable under Article 17 if accompanied by bodily in-
jury.135 The court noted that the Longos had alleged mental
injury that, although accompanied by physical injury, was unre-
lated to the physical injury-mental distress that flowed from
their fear of death during the crash and continued fear of fly-
ing-and not emotional injuries related to their physical
injuries. 136
The Northern District of California next examined this issue
in Hermano v. United Airlines.137 The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the airline in a situation where a Brazilian
citizen and resident of the United States boarded a United Air-
lines flight in Los Angeles with the intent to fly to Miami to con-
nect with another flight to Brazil.138 The plaintiff checked four
parcels that contained some motorcycle parts.'3 9 After boarding
and before departure, an airline official approached the plain-
tiff and asked if he was carrying a firearm in his checked bag-
gage.' 4 0 After he replied, "no," Hermano was taken off of the
airplane, brought to the ticket counter, and had his luggage re-
x-rayed. 4' When it became clear that the plaintiffs luggage did
not contain a gun, the airline apologized, and the plaintiff was
booked on an alternative flight to Miami.' 4 2 There, he joined
his flight to Brazil and arrived on schedule with his luggage and
without further delay.'4 3 The plaintiff filed suit against United
133 Id.
134 Id. at *2.
135 Id. (citing E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991)).
136 Id. see also Wencelius v. Air Fr. Inc., No. SACV95-359-AHS, 1996 WL 866122,
at *1, (C.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 1996) (holding that the plaintiffs claims for emotional
distress were limited to damages caused by physical injuries, while claims for any
other emotional distress, including those from the accident itself, were
dismissed).
137 No. C-99-0105-SI, 1999 WL 1269187, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 1999).
138 Id. at *1, *6.
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Airlines alleging damages for unlawful arrest and detention, def-
amation, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.'44
The court noted that Hermano's only recovery must be under
the Warsaw Convention, citing Tseng.14 5 The court then noted
that under Floyd and Article 17, air carriers may not be liable for
emotional or psychological injuries under the Warsaw Conven-
tion's Article 17.14 ' Brushing aside plaintiffs arguments that
symptoms stemming from his emotional distress included physi-
cal manifestations of injury, such as headaches, nausea, panic
attacks, trembling, and palpitations, the court found that these
symptoms did not qualify as a physical injury under Article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention. 1
47
The court focused on the language of the district court deci-
sion in Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, noting that the claims of the
plaintiff in that case included headache, upset stomach, ringing
in her ears, nervousness and sleeplessness as a consequence of
the search carried out by a security officer. 48 The Tseng court
acknowledged that the Floyd court had said that "physical mani-
festations of injury" may be a type of compensable injury, but
the Hermano Court pointed out that the Supreme Court in Tseng
had interpreted that same language to not disturb the lower
"court's finding that the plaintiffs injuries did not constitute
'bodily injury' under the Convention.' 49  From this, the
Hermano court concluded that the plaintiff could not bring a
claim for these kinds of injuries under the Convention. 51
Circuit courts that have considered this issue consistently have
required that emotional injuries flow from a physical injury to
be compensable under the Convention. In Carey v. United Air-
lines,'5 1 the Ninth Circuit considered such an emotional injury
claim based on later physical manifestations in an appeal of an
order granting the airline's motion for summaryjudgment. The
plaintiff argued that his physical manifestations of nausea,
cramps, perspiration, nervousness, tension, and sleeplessness,
which resulted from a confrontation with a flight attendant, con-
144 Id.
145 Id. at *3 (citing El A] Isr. Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 161 (1999)).
146 Id. at *4.
147 Id.
148 Id. (citing Tseng v. El A] Isr. Airlines, 919 F. Supp. 155, 157 (S.D.N.Y.
1996)).
149 Id. (citing Tseng, 525 U.S. at 176).
150 Id.
15, 255 F.3d 1044, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2001).
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stituted a bodily injury. 152 The Ninth Circuit held that physical
manifestations of emotional and mental distress do not satisfy
the "bodily injury" requirement in Article 17.153
Recently, the Second Circuit expressed a similar view regard-
ing emotional injury in Ehrlich v. American Airlines.154 In Ehrlich,
an American Airlines flight landed at New York's JFK Interna-
tional Airport at a high rate of speed and overran the end of the
runway. 155 An arrestor bed abruptly stopped the plane from
plunging off the end of the runway into Thurston Bay. 156 The
plaintiffs claimed to suffer bodily and mental injuries during the
course of the overrun landing and ensuing evacuation. ,5
Following the framework of Saks, Floyd, and Tseng, the Ehrlich
court conducted a thorough examination of the text of the War-
saw Convention, the negotiations that led to the adoption of the
treaty, the goals its provisions aim to address, French law, the
opinions of sister Convention signatories, and the meaning at-
tributed to Article 17 of the Convention by the Executive
Branch.158 The court then stated, "[o]ur exhaustive examina-
tion of these sources leads us to conclude that a carrier may be
held liable under Article 17 for mental injuries only if they are
caused by bodily injuries. "159 The Ehrlich court specifically re-
jected the notion that emotional distress injuries that flow from
an accident or that become manifest in physical injuries consti-
tute a "bodily injury" under Article 17 of the Convention. 16 0
b. Minority View - Emotional Injury Accompanied by
Physical Injury or Physical Manifestation
Some cases have found that emotional injury damages may be
recoverable as long as they are accompanied by physical injuries.
For example, the court in In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn
relied upon language in Floyd, expressing no view whether pas-
sengers can recover for mental injuries accompanied by physical
injuries, and found that the physical injury of death allowed for
152 Id. at 1051.
153 Id. at 1051-52.
154 360 F.3d 366, 366-67 (2d Cir. 2004).




159 Id. at 400.
160 Id. at 386-87.
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recovery of the mental injury of pre-death pain and suffering."'
The Roselawn court determined that a causal connection is only
required between the damage sustained and the accident, thus
dispensing with the necessity for a causal connection between
the physical injury and the emotional injury. 162
Several district court cases deciding dispositive motions have
found that the simple notice pleading of emotional injury ac-
companied by physical injury is sufficient to survive motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, and that some evidence of
such an injury is sufficient to survive motions for summary judg-
ment. For example, in Chendrimada v. Air-India, the court de-
nied partial summary judgment to the air carrier in a case in
which the passengers alleged physical injury and emotional in-
jury as a result of confinement on an airplane for 111/2 hours
without food during a delay caused by heavy fog.'"
The air carrier moved for summary judgment, arguing that
the plaintiffs' claims amounted to nothing more than emotional
distress injuries that were not compensable under Article 17 of
the Convention.1"4 In denying the summary judgment motion,
the court focused on the Supreme Court's statement in Floyd
that it was not expressing a view whether passengers could re-
cover for mental injuries accompanied by physical injuries. 6 5
The Chendrimada court then raised the question whether the
plaintiffs had adequately alleged a physical injury to prevent a
summary judgment.1 6" The court concluded that it must accept
the contention that a physical injury had occurred as a result of
deprivation of food, based on a plaintiff's affidavit that he had
become "weak, experienced nausea, suffered severe cramps,
pain and anguish, and suffered malnutrition as well as mental
injury. ' 67
161 In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 954 F. Supp.
175 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
162 Id.
163 802 F. Spp. 1089, 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that the aircraft was
delayed for eleven and one half hours due to heavy fog during a stop in Delhi,
India, on an international flight from New York to Bombay, India. The plaintiffs
claimed that confinement by airline on the aircraft during the delay without food
caused physical and emotional injury).
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1091 (citing E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 553 (1991)).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1092; see also Chukwu v. Air Fr., 218 F. Supp. 2d. 979, 1983 (N.D. 111.
2002) (denying motion to dismiss by airline where plaintiff alleged that airline
deprived her of food and beverages during international flight and denied her
access to a wheelchair to accommodate her apparent physical disability);
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A few cases decided after a trial on the merits since Floyd have
concluded that emotional distress accompanied by physical in-
jury or manifesting in physical injury is sufficient to allow recov-
ery of damages under Article 17. In Gonzalez v. TACA
International Airlines, the court entered judgment after trial in
favor of a plaintiff who, while on a flight from New Orleans to
San Salvador, had the contents of a meal tray spilled on him, was
served a beverage containing a small piece of plastic, and was
forced to check carry-on luggage that contained his medica-
tions. ' The court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to emo-
tional distress damages under this set of circumstances because
he suffered an attack of anginal pain during the flight and,
upon landing in San Jose, Costa Rica, was hospitalized for a pe-
riod of approximately one month. 169 In reviewing evidence
presented by doctors for the plaintiff that his pre-existing critical
coronary disease could be triggered by anxiety, and that the con-
ditions to which he was exposed during the flight were the likely
cause of his angina, the court awarded a nominal sum of dam-
ages for plaintiff's "bodily injury."17"
In ruling on post-trial motions, the court in McCaskey v. Conti-
nental Airlines concluded that, in the face of Floyd and Tseng, a
physical injury is only a "gateway" requirement under Article 17
in order for emotional injury damages to be awarded. 171 In Mc-
Caskey, a husband and wife flew on a Continental Airlines flight
from Houston to Newark en route to their ultimate destination
Weinerth v. El Al Isr. Airlines, No. CV-97-6356, 1999 WL 718087, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
July 7, 1999) (denying motion to dismiss by airline where plaintiffs alleged that
lost luggage contained medications, and the husband, who suffered from ele-
vated blood sugar, alleged chest pains throughout the flight and required medi-
cal attention in Israel after the flight); Hunt v. TACA Int'l Airlines, Inc., No.
Civ.A. 96-3064, 1997 WL 738594, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 1997) (denying motion
for summary judgment by airline where the plaintiff alleged injuries to his head
and back during emergency landing which exacerbated his pre-existing posttrau-
matic stress disorder, sustained as a result of previous airline accident with the
same defendant, and the onset of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease from which plaintiff
ultimately died. The medical evidence offered in support of these injuries cre-
ated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs mental distress
related to physical manifestation of injuries.); Ratnaswamy v. Air Afrique, No. 95-
C 7670, 1998 WL 111652, at *1, *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1998) (denying motion for
partial summary judgment by airline in "bumping" incident in Darfur, Sudan,
where plaintiffs alleged anxiety and distress with physical symptoms that included
nausea, diarrhea, and fever caused by incident).
168 No. Civ.A.91-0175, 1992 WL 142399, at *1, *5 (E.D. La. June 18, 1992).
169 Id. at *3.
170 Id. at *3, *5.
171 159 F. Supp. 2d 562, 569 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
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of Frankfurt. 172 During the flight from Houston to Newark, the
husband experienced a stroke. 7 ' The husband was taken off
the plane in Newark and hospitalized.174 After recuperating for
several weeks in the hospital, the husband died while returning
to Tulsa by train. 175
The wife brought suit for the husband's physical injury and
death and for her own emotional distress, arguing that the air-
line's failure to properly deal with her husband's stroke en route
from Houston to Newark constituted an "accident," giving rise
to damages under the Convention."7' The McCaskey court
agreed that a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the
husband had suffered a physical injury aboard the aircraft as a
result of an accident under Article 17.177 The court found that
because the Warsaw Convention was a "pass-through," allowing
the application of the law that would govern in the absence of
the Warsaw Convention, the husband's injury was a sufficient
"gateway" to "bodily injury" under Article 17 to allow the wife,
who had not been physically injured, to recover for her own
emotional injury where applicable state law allowed such a
recovery. 1
78
Against the backdrop of these divergent views on when emo-
tional injury damages may be recovered as a component of
"bodily injury" under Article 17, several courts have considered
claims specifically based upon PTSD.
IV. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF PTSD CLAIMS UNDER THE
WARSAW CONVENTION
Since PTSD was first recognized in 1980 as a psychological
disorder that can be isolated and diagnosed, legal and factual
issues have emerged regarding the classification of the disorder
as a "bodily injury" under Article 17. In an effort to satisfy the
physical injury requirement established by Floyd, plaintiffs have
claimed PTSD has led to physical symptoms such as nausea,
cramps, weight loss, anxiety, increased heart rate, sleeplessness,
172 Id. at 565.
173 Id. at 566.
174 Id. at 568.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 568-72.
177 Id. at 574.
178 Id. at 576. In so finding, the McCaskey court did not require that either the
husband or wife meet the threshold Article 17 requirement of a "bodily injury."
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and headache.171 In these cases, recovery is often denied by
courts that characterize these symptoms as a physical manifesta-
tion of emotional distress not compensable under the Warsaw
Convention." ° More recently, plaintiffs have sought recovery
for PTSD by claiming that PTSD is, itself, a physical injury caus-
ing changes to the architecture and function of the brain. 181
Courts that have considered PTSD claims in this context gener-
ally either reject the theory that PTSD is, itself, a physical injury
to the brain or conclude that there is no evidence to support a
nexus between the plaintiffs symptoms and a brain injury. 182
Both approaches result in analyzing PTSD claims as an emo-
tional injury or as a physical manifestation of emotional injury.
The greater weight of authority appears to follow the distinction
drawn by the Supreme Court in Floyd and Tseng, and observed in
the majority of lower court cases decided in their wake, that
damages for emotional injury and physical manifestation of
emotional injury are not recoverable under the Convention un-
less they flow from a physical injury."8 Thus, recovery for PTSD
by a majority of courts would be allowed only to the extent that
PTSD was the result of palpable and conspicuous physical injury
to the body.
A. THE MAJORITY VIEW - PTSD AS EMOTIONAL INJURY
1. Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd.
The majority of courts confronted with PTSD claims framed
in terms of physical symptoms have rejected these claims as
physical manifestations of emotional distress. The Third Circuit
in Terraftanca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. was the first court of
appeals to analyze a PTSD claim within the framework of
Floyd.18 1 In Terrafranca, plaintiff learned of a bomb threat while
traveling on an international flight to London, England, and
179 See, e.g., Turturro v. Cont'l Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 173-74 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); Terrafranca v. Virgin At. Airways, Ltd., 151 F.3d 108, 109 (3d Cir. 1998);
Alvarez v. Am. Airlines Inc., No. 98-Civ.-1027, 1999 WL 691922, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 7, 1999).
180 See, e.g., Terrafranca, 151 F.3d at 112.
181 See, e.g., Bobian v. CSA Czech Airlines, 93 Fed. Appx. 406, 407 (3d Cir.
2004); Alvarez v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 98-Civ.-1027 (MBM), 2000 WL 145746, at
*2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2000).
182 See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Ark. on June 1, 1999, 291 F.3d 503,
511 (8th Cir. 2002); Bobian, 93 Fed. Appx. at 408; Ligeti v. British Airways, No. 00-
Civ.- 2936, 2001 WL 1356238, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2001).
183 49 AM. JUR. POF 2D Post-Traumatic Stress.
184 151 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 1998).
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subsequently claimed to suffer from PTSD complicated by an-
orexia.811 The plaintiff argued that her seventeen-pound weight
loss was a physical manifestation of injury and therefore com-
pensable under the Warsaw Convention.'
Plaintiff relied upon the Supreme Court's conclusion in Floyd
that "an air carrier cannot be liable under Article 17 when an
accident has not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical in-
jury, or physical manifestation of injury."'187 In ruling on a sum-
mary judgment motion brought by the airline, the Third Circuit
concluded that Floyd's "physical manifestation" language refers
only to "bodily injury."'88 The plaintiffs PTSD claim alleged a
physical manifestation of an emotional injury and, therefore,
was not compensable under the Convention."' However, in Ter-
rafranca, the Third Circuit was not confronted with allegations
that PTSD was, itself, a physical injury to the brain.
2. Alvarez v. American Airlines, Inc.
The Southern District of New York considered a claim for
PTSD in Alvarez v. American Airlines, Inc. 9 ' The plaintiff alleged
that he suffered slight bruising of his knees and buttocks and
PTSD as a result of an emergency evacuation. 9 ' Plaintiff al-
leged that PTSD is not purely a psychic injury, but also a physical
injury, the physical manifestations of which include increased
heart rate, elevated blood pressure, and disruptions to normal
life as a result of changes in the brain and nervous system.'92
The district court considered the physical aspects of PTSD in
ruling on a motion for summary judgment brought by the air-
line, but determined that the injury was a purely psychological
or emotional injury.' The court granted summary judgment,
concluding that the physical manifestations of PTSD were not
185 Id. at 109.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 111 (citing E.Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, at 552 (1991)).
188 Id.
'19 Id. at 112. The Third Circuit opinion in Terrafranca directly addressed dif-
ferences in the way the Supreme Court expressed the holding in Floyd at 499 U.S.
at 534, and dicta in the conclusion of that opinion at 499 U.S. at 552, concluding
that the "imprecise dictum at the end of the opinion" meant that "the 'physical
manifestation' language refers only to 'bodily injury."' Terrafranca, 151 F.3d at
111.
190 No. 98-Civ.-1027, 1999 WL 691922 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1999).
19, Id. at *1.
192 Id.
193 Id. at *5.
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proximately caused by the physical injury suffered by plaintiff
during the accident.19 4
On appeal, in a Rule 60(b) (1) motion, the plaintiffs urged
that "PTSD is a physical, and not merely a psychological injury,"
citing an affidavit of a medical expert.195 The court noted that
plaintiffs expert witness did not state that any relevant "physical
changes" in plaintiffs brain or nervous system resulted from
physical trauma suffered during the evacuation. 19 6 The court
reasoned that if physical manifestations of psychic distress, such
as increased heart rate and elevated blood pressure, could sup-
port a recovery under the Convention, any passenger frightened
by turbulence could recover, and the distinction between psy-
chological and physical injuries would disappear.' 97 If that were
the rule, the holding of Floyd that Article 17 does not allow re-
covery for purely psychological injuries would be converted into
a mere pleading formality. 98
3. Turturro v. Continental Airlines
The Southern District of New York reached a similar result
one year later. In Turturro v. Continental Airlines, the plaintiff
alleged that she suffered from the physical injury of PTSD as a
result of an airline employee's treatment of her when she asked
to deplane prior to departure because of anxiety.' 99 The plain-
tiff alleged she suffered physical symptoms, including sweating,
nausea, accelerated heartbeat, and stomach pain. 9°°
In ruling on a summary judgment motion brought by the air-
line, the district court found that these symptoms "arose solely
from her emotional distress, as opposed to having an indepen-
dent physical genesis in the accident itself," and granted the air-
194 Id. (The Alvarez court stated that:
[P]laintiffs have not claimed that the psychological and emotional
injuries Alvarez has allegedly suffered . . . have been proximately
caused by his physical injuries. To the contrary, the record shows
that the trauma that has allegedly left Alvarez with post-traumatic
stress disorder . . . is the evacuation of Flight 587, not the slight
bruising of his knees and buttocks that accompanied the
evacuation.
Id. at *5.
195 Alvarez v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 98-Civ-1027 (MBM), 2000 WL 145746, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2000).
196 Id. at *3.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 3.
199 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
200 Id. at 173-74.
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line's summary judgment motion.2  However, the Turturro
court expressly acknowledged that, in recent lawsuits, victims of
chronic PTSD have tendered evidence that the disorder consti-
tutes a physical injury to the brain. 2°2 "New technology has al-
lowed doctors to perceive that extreme stress, such as a near-
death experience or being taken hostage, can actually change
brain cell structure and cause a specific area of the brain to atro-
phy.' '20 3 Recovery was denied in Turturro because the plaintiff
did not advance evidence of "either a brain-lesion theory of
PTSD or individualized proof of such lesions. 21 4 The court
stated that the plaintiff had not adequately pleaded PTSD as a
bodily injury to survive a motion for summary judgment.20 5
4. Ligeti v. British Airways
The Southern District of New York again considered a PTSD
claim in Ligeti v. British Airways PLC.2°6 In this case, the plaintiff
alleged she suffered from PTSD as a result of physical injuries to
her side and elbow and her confinement in the lavatory during
a period of turbulence.2 ° v The district court noted that an acci-
dent victim's PTSD can itself constitute a physical injury because
it results in discernable physical changes to the structure of the
brain, quoting its decision in Turturro and other cases for this
proposition. 2"8 However, the court ruled on summary judgment
that plaintiff could not recover damages on the theory that
PTSD is a bodily injury, because she failed to offer evidence that
her brain underwent any physical changes as a result of the
incident. 219
201 Id. at 178.
202 Id. at 178-79 (citing Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D.
Mont. 1999)). The Turturro decision was filed onJanuary 16, 2001, before Weaver
was vacated on April 25, 2002. Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1252
(D. Mont. 2002).
20- Turturro, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 178.
204 Id. at 179.
205 Id.
206 No. 00-Civ.-2936(FM), 2001 WL 1356238, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2001).
207 Id. at *1-2.
208 Id. at *5 (citing Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D.
Mont. 1999)). The Ligeti decision was also filed on November 5, 2001, before
Weaver was vacated on April 25, 2002. Weaver, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 1252.
2- Ligeti, 2001 WL 1356238, at *5.
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5. In re Air Crash at Little Rock Arkansas
The Eighth Circuit considered a passenger's claim that PTSD
was a compensable injury under the Convention in In re Air
Crash at Little Rock.2 10 An American Airlines flight crashed on
the runway at Little Rock Airport, killing the pilot and ten pas-
sengers. 211 The plaintiff survived the crash by crawling out of a
burning hole in the wreckage.212 In the process, the plaintiff
suffered smoke inhalation, deep cuts to her lower legs, injuries
to her quadriceps, and was later diagnosed with PTSD. 3 After
a jury trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff on a $6.5 million jury verdict. 214
American Airlines moved for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, arguing that the plaintiffs mental injuries, including
PTSD, are not recoverable under the Warsaw Convention or, in
the alternative, that if they are recoverable, they are recoverable
only to the extent that they flow from physical injuries.215 The
trial court allowed recovery for plaintiffs PTSD based on three
alternatives 6.2 1  First, the district court found that any physical
injury is sufficient to trigger recovery for all emotional damages,
regardless of the causal connection between the two. 217 Second,
the district court reasoned that the plaintiff adequately estab-
lished a nexus between her physical injuries and her mental in-
juries sufficient to justify a $6.5 million verdict. 2 8 Finally, the
court offered the position that PTSD was itself a physical injury
to the brain within the meaning of Warsaw, allowing for com-
219plete recovery.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit considered both the majority
position regarding mental injuries expressed by the Northern
District of California in Jack and the minority position expressed
210 In reAir Crash at Little Rock, Ark., on June 1, 1999, 291 F.3d 503, 506 (8th
Cir. 2002).
211 Id. at 506.
212 In reAir Crash at Little Rock, Ark., on June 1, 1999, 118 F. Supp. 2d 916,
918 (E.D. Ark. 2000), rev'd in part, 291 F.3d 503 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 974 (2002).
213 In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Ark., 291 F.3d at 507.
214 Id. at 508.
215 Id. at 509.
216 Little Rock, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 925.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 924-25. The Little Rock decision by the district court was filed on Octo-
ber 27, 2000, before Weaver was vacated on April 25, 2002. Weaver v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D. Mont. 2002).
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by the Northern District of Illinois in Roselawn.2 2 "  The Eighth
Circuit became the first circuit court to adopt the approach ar-
ticulated in Jack that damages for mental injuries under the War-
saw Convention must proximately flow from physical injuries
caused by the accident.22 I The Eighth Circuit reversed in part
the district court's decision, and found that the plaintiff is al-
lowed recovery for mental injuries, including PTSD, only to the
extent the emotional damages "flow from" or are caused by the
injuries to her legs and smoke inhalation.222 The circuit court
rejected the notion that the plaintiff established a sufficient
nexus between her relatively insignificant physical injuries and
her very significant mental injuries. 223 The court also rejected
the plaintiffs contention that PTSD itself was a physical injury to
the brain.224 The court noted that there was a complete lack of
proof that the plaintiff suffered changes to her brain as a result
of chronic PTSD. 225 No brain imaging was conducted, and no
blood tests were performed to establish that the plaintiff exper-
ienced any damage to her brain.226 The symptoms of disrupted
sleep, inability to concentrate, and flashbacks were not adequate
to establish a physical change to the plaintiffs brain.22 7
6. Bobian v. CSA Czech Airlines
The Third Circuit again considered a claim for PTSD under
the Warsaw Convention in Bobian v. Czech Airlines where plain-
tiffs alleged they suffered from PTSD after flying through forty-
five minutes of severe turbulence associated with a hurricane. " '2
Unlike Terrafranca, the plaintiffs characterized PTSD as a physi-
cal injury to brain "cells as a result of the excessive release of
excitatory neurotransmitters that produce a local excitotoxic re-
action and over-abundant release of glucocorticoids. ' 'u 29 These
biochemical releases, which occur during extreme stress, were
220 In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Ark., 291 F.3d at 509-11 (adopting the reasoning
in Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654, 665 (N.D. Cal. 1994), and
rejecting the holding in In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind., 954 F. Supp.
175, 178-79 (N.D. Il. 1997)).
221 Id. at 509-10.
222 Id. at 506, 511.





228 93 Fed. Appx. 406, 407 (3d Cir. 2004).
229 Id. at 407.
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alleged to physically damage and kill cells within the brain, re-
sulting in physical destruction (atrophy) of portions of the
hippocampus.23 °
Despite this expert testimony, the Third Circuit upheld a
grant of summary judgment by the district court in favor of the
airline, finding that it was bound by their decision in Terrafranca,
which specifically rejected PTSD as a Warsaw Convention-com-
pensable injury.23' Although Terrafranca did not concern a
claim that PTSD was, itself, a physical injury, the Bobian court
reasoned that the relationship between the physical and emo-
tional dimensions of human existence was well known to the
drafters of the Warsaw Convention, who nonetheless required
"lesion corporelle. '' 23 2 In the Third Circuit's view, the "plain-
tiffs' position on [PTSD] would abolish the requirement for a
palpable and conspicuous physical injury, [which] can only be
done by a change to the language of the Convention. '23 3 Fur-
ther, the Court noted that none of the plaintiffs had "brought
forward cognizable evidence that his or her brain changed phys-
ically from an earlier state. 23 4
B. THE MINORITY VIEW - PTSD AS BODILY INJURY
1. Weaver v. Delta Airlines
The only case that appears to have explicitly found that PTSD
constitutes a physical injury to the brain, thus allowing recovery
of damages for bodily injury under Article 17, is Weaver v. Delta
Airlines, Inc.23 15 In Weaver, the plaintiff suffered from chronic
PTSD as a result of an emergency landing due to a mechanical
malfunction.23 6 Plaintiff alleged that her PTSD was a physical
injury for purposes of the Warsaw Convention and attached sev-
eral articles from scientific journals and expert reports in sup-
port of his allegations.23 v Weaver argued that recent medical
evidence demonstrates "that extreme stress causes actual physi-
230 Id.
231 Id. at 408.
232 Id. at 407-08.
233 Id. at 408.
234 Id.
235 Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Mont. 1999), vacated,
Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D. Mont. 2002).
236 Id.
237 Id. at 1190-91.
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cal brain damage," such as "physical destruction or atrophy of
portions of the hippocampus. '
The district court held that Weaver's chronic PTSD was a
"bodily injury" for purposes of the Convention.2 3"' The court
stated that this claim was distinguishable from previous cases de-
nying recovery because Weaver's claim was presented as a physi-
cal injury supported by "recent scientific research explaining
that [PTSD] evidences actual trauma to brain cell structures. 240
The decision was later vacated pursuant to a joint stipulation of
the parties. 4'
Since Weaver, several courts have acknowledged recent medi-
cal research regarding the physical aspects of PTSD, thus leaving
open the possibility for recovery under Article 17 of the Conven-
tion. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Carey v. United Airlines ac-
knowledged in a footnote that one district court case had
recognized PTSD as a "bodily injury" for purposes of the Warsaw
Convention. 42 While this had no effect on the decision in Carey
because there were no allegations of biochemical reactions in
the brain as the result of terror, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless
noted that a possibility for recovery remains where there is no
visible "bodily injury" based on this theory. 3 ' Likewise, the dis-
trict court in Turturro acknowledged that the brain's physical ar-
chitecture can undergo transformations related to PTSD and
that under some circumstances a diagnosis of chronic PTSD
may fall within the Convention's definition of "bodily injury. "244
Again, this recognition did not affect the court's decision be-
cause such a brain injury was not alleged.
238 Id. at 1191.
2-,11 Id. at 1192.
'240 Id.
241 Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D. Mont. 2002). Vacatur
eliminates the precedential value of the judgment. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v.
Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 22 (1994). The effect of vacatur on a district
court decision, which binds no other court, is "the loss of persuasive authority for
the district court's judgment." Russman v. Bd. of Educ. of Enlarged City School
Dist. of Watervliet, 260 F.3d 114, 122 n.2 (2d Cir. 2001).
242 255 F.3d 1044, 1053 n.47 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Weaver, 56 F. Supp. 2d at
1190). The Cary decision was filed on July 3, 2001, before Weaverwas vacated on
April 25, 2002. Weaver, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 1252.
243 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1053.
244 Turturro v. Cont'l Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 179 (citing Weaver, 56 F.
StIpp. 2d at 1190). The Turturro decision was filed on Jan. 16, 2001, before
Weaver was vacated on April 25, 2002. Weaver, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 1252.
20051 459
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
2. Potential Proof Problems
Although several courts have acknowledged the possibility of
recovery for PSTD under the Warsaw Convention based on the
theory that PTSD is, itself, a bodily injury, with the reversal of
the district court's decision in Little Rock and the vacatur of the
district court's decision in Weaver, there is no judicial precedent
for this proposition. Moreover, advocates of this theory are
presented with several evidentiary obstacles if they hope to pre-
vail in litigation.24 5
Litigants must not only allege a brain injury as a result of
PTSD to survive summary judgment, but must also prove that
they have suffered a physical change to their brain as a result of
the accident. The first obstacle to overcome is a Daubert4 6 hear-
ing to determine whether the theory that physical changes to
the brain resulting from PTSD is recognized in the psychiatric
community. 247
Next, the plaintiff must establish a nexus between the scien-
tific theory and a physical change in the plaintiff's brain sup-
ported by objective scientific tests. 248 As noted by the Second
Circuit in Little Rock, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) ,249 pos-
itron emission tomography (PET)250 scans, and single photon
245 See In reAir Crash at Little Rock, Ark. OnJune 1, 1999, 291 F.3d 503, 513-15
(8th Cir. 2002).
246 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see FED. R. EVID.
702 (providing Daubert criteria for expert testimony); In re Air Crash at Little Rock,
Ark., 291 F.3d at 514 (an applying the Daubert criteria to a PTSD case arising
under the Warsaw Convention).
247 See, e.g., M.C. v. Yeargin, 11 S.W.3d 604, 618-20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (find-
ing that an expert's testimony that plaintiff suffered brain damage in the form of
decreased hippocampal volume due to post traumatic stress disorder related to
her attack in a hotel room was inadmissible to show damages in negligence ac-
tion against hotel, absent trial court finding that expert's theory was based on
scientific principles generally accepted in the relevant scientific community).
248 In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Ark., 291 F.3d at 514-15.
249 MRI produces images of brain structure by passing a strong magnetic field
and a varying radio signal through the head and detecting a radio signal emitted
from atomic nuclei in response to that signal. See K.K. Kwong et al., Dynamic
Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Human Brain Activity During Primary Sensory Stimula-
tion, 89 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 5675 (1992).
250 PET scans measure changes in glucose metabolism or blood flow associated
with brain function by detecting positrons, positively charged particles emitted by
radioactively labeled substances, which have been injected into the body. SeeJo-
seph A. Ricker & Ross D. Zafonte, Functional Nevroimaging and Quantitative Elec-
troencephalography in Adult Traumatic Head Injury: Clinical Applications and
Interpretive Cautions, 15 J. HEAD TRAUMA REHAB. 859-68 (2000).
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emission computed tomography (SPECT)215 scans are all uti-
lized to measure brain structure and function, while blood tests
may detect elevated levels of cortisol or other hormones, which
could indicate a dysfunctioning hypothalamus or thyroid. 5S
These techniques are beset by evidentiary shortcomings in the
diagnosis of PTSD.25 : Currently, the primary use of these tech-
niques in the context of PTSD is as a scientific research tool
rather than as a medical diagnostic tool.2 "4 They each take a
snapshot of the brain's structure or function at a moment in
time.2 5 In order to show physical change in the brain over
time, particularly as a result of a discrete incident, there must be
baseline information concerning the condition of the brain at
an earlier point in time to serve as a control. 256 Furthermore,
unique brain scan patterns have yet to be developed for specific
illnesses, and scans can be affected by a myriad of extraneous
variables. 25 '7 All of these evidentiary barriers must be overcome
to prevail on a claim that PTSD is a physical injury to the brain.
V. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE MONTREAL
CONVENTION ON PTSD CLAIMS
The Warsaw Convention has been modified several times over
the years through amendments and private agreements. Almost
all of these changes were made to appease the United States'
objections to the low liability limits set by the Convention. In
response to a growing discontent with the Warsaw Convention's
251 SPECT is a technique similar to PET, that measures blood flow to tissue by
detecting photons from radioactive tracers injected into the body. See Report of
the Therapeutics & Tech. Assessment Subcomm. of the Am. Acad. of Neurology,
Assessment of Brain SPEC, 46 NEUROLOc;NY 278-85 (1996).
252 In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Ark., 291 F.3d at 511.
253 SeeJackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow PET scan evi-
dence where the state's expert testified that the use of PET scans to diagnose
chronic PCP abuse is not generally accepted by the scientific community); see also
Penney v. Praxair, Inc., 116 F.3d 330, 333-34 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
plaintiff failed to establish sufficient foundation for admission of PET scan of his
brain, which the expert used to compare to the control group, where it was not
clear that the control group would provide accurate comparisons).
254 See Society of Nuclear Medicine Brain Imaging Council, Ethical Clinical Prac-
tice of Functional Brain Inaging, 37J. NUCLEAR MED. 1257-58 (1996) [hereinafter
Society of Nuclear Medicine].
255 See generally Ricker, supra note 250, at 859-68.
256 See Society of Nuclear Medicine, supra note 254, at 1257-58.
257 See, e.g., Martin Lasden, Mr. Chiesa Brain: Can High-Tech Scans Prove That
Criminal Acts Are the Result of a Damaged Brain?, CAL. LAW., Nov. 2004, at 30.
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limitations, the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), an agency of the United Nations, convened the Inter-
national Conference on Air Law in Montreal in May 1999 with
the goal of drafting a comprehensive replacement to the sev-
enty-year-old Warsaw Convention. The ICAO's efforts
culminated with the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules for International Carriage by Air, Montreal, on May 28,
1999 (commonly known as the "Montreal Convention").258
The Montreal Convention entered into force in the
United States on November 4, 2003, and its provisions will gov-
ern future PTSD claims by international air passengers. 259 The
major feature of the Montreal Convention is the concept of un-
limited liability for air carriers.26' This is considered a vast im-
provement over the liability regime of Warsaw, relative to
passenger rights in the event of an accident. 261 Among other
benefits to passengers, the Montreal Convention eliminates the
cap on carrier liability for passenger injury or death,262 holds
carriers strictly liable for proven damages, up to 100,000 Special
Drawing Rights, 263 changes the basis for unlimited liability from
an intent to cause damage or recklessness standard to a rebutta-
ble presumption of negligence standard, 264 and expands the ba-
258 Montreal Convention, supra note 4.
259 As of November 9, 2004, there were 151 parties to the Warsaw Convention
but only 59 parties to the Montreal Convention. See International Civil Aviation
Organization Treaty Collection, http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/treaty.htm
(last visited Sept. 14, 2005).
260 See Blanca I. Rodriguez, Recent Developments in Aviation Law, 66 J. AIR L. &
COM. 21 (2000) (discussing the changes made to the Warsaw Convention by the
Montreal Convention); see also Pablo Mendes De Leon & Werner Eyskens, The
Montreal Convention: Analysis of Some Aspects of the Attempted Modernization and Con-
solidation of the Warsaw System, 66J. AIR L. & COM. 1155 (2001).
261 Letter of Transmittal of Strobe Talbott (June 23, 2000), reprinted in Mon-
treal Convention, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 1999 WL 33292734 [hereinafter
Talbott].
262 Id.
263 The Special Drawing Right (SDR) is a monetary unit determined daily by
the International Monetary Fund. United Nations Statistics Definition of SDRs,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/databases.htm (follow "United Nations Common
Database" hyperlink; then follow "Definitions" hyperlink; then follow "special
drawing rights (SDR's)" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 14, 2005). As of November
2004, the value of 100,000 SDRs was approximately $149,800. See International
Monetary Fund, http://www.imforg/external/np/index.htm (last visited Nov. 11,
2004).
264 Article 25 of the Convention lifts the limitation on liability under certain
conditions. Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002).
The Montreal Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air (1975), amends Article 25
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sis for jurisdiction for claims to permit suits in the passenger's
homeland if certain conditions are met.1 ' 5 The preamble to the
Montreal Convention makes explicit the importance of ensur-
ing the protection of consumer interests and the need for equi-
table compensation based upon the principle of restitution.
Hence, many commentators have described the Montreal Con-
vention as a treaty that favors passengers rather than airlines.266
Despite the many benefits to passengers that flow from the
Montreal Convention, in terms of removal of damages caps and
greater access to favored forums through expanded jurisdic-
tional grounds, the Montreal Convention does not expand the
conditions for passenger recovery for bodily injury. The new
language of Article 17 of the Montreal Convention provides:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or
bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the acci-
dent which caused the death or injury took place on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking.2
6 7
To a large degree, this language is identical to the language of
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and leaves its liability struc-
ture, which was developed from extensive judicial precedent,
unchanged. When the delegates at the Montreal Conference
discussed the scope of the proposed Article 17, they specifically
considered extending the carrier's liability to "mental inju-
ries. ' 26" An extensive review of the Conference's drafting his-
tory conducted by the Second Circuit in Ehrlich concluded that
the delegates conveyed a wide range of opinions on whether
mental injuries should be expressly included, and their discus-
sion did not lead to a general consensus on the subject.2 6 9 Una-
by replacing "willful misconduct" with the language "done with intent to cause
damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result."
Id. The United States Senate ratified the Protocol in November 1998, and it went
into force in the United States on March 4, 1999. Id. (citing Carey v. United
Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044, 1047 n. 11 (9th Cir. 2001)).
265 Id.
266 Thomas J. Whalen, The New Warsaw Convention: The Montreal Convention, 25
AIR & SPACE L. 12, 14 (2000); but seeJ.C. Batra, Modernization Of The Warsaw Sys-
tem-Montreal 1999, 65J. AIR L. & CoM. 429, 443 (2000); Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 371 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2004).
267 Montreal Convention, supra note 4, at art. 17(1).
268 See Ehrlich, 360 F.3d at 392-94 (providing a thorough discussion of the posi-
tions of the delegates to the Montreal Convention concerning the scope of Arti-
cle 17 liability).
269 Id. at 391-92.
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ble to reach a common understanding, the Conference
ultimately left unchanged the "bodily injury" language of the
Warsaw Convention.27 °
Because English is one of the six authentic texts of the Mon-
treal Convention, interpretation of the French term "ldsion
corporelle" may no longer be relevant to determine the extent
of carrier liability for mental injury.271 However, as stated in the
explanatory Article 17 of note to the Montreal Convention,
upon submission to the Senate, the legal framework developed
under the Warsaw Convention's "lesion corporelle" language
was left unchanged by the Montreal Convention.
Following extensive debate, the Conference decided not to in-
clude an express reference to recovery for mental injury, with the
intention that the definition of "bodily injury" would continue to
evolve from judicial precedent developed under Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention, which uses that term. 72
This treaty history was before the Senate at the time of ratifi-
cation and suggests the intent of the signatories, particularly the
United States, was that the language of Article 17 of the Mon-
treal Convention works no change to the definition of "bodily
injury" as the courts have interpreted it under the Warsaw Con-
vention. 73 Thus, carrier liability under the Montreal Conven-
tion will continue to require "bodily injury" as interpreted under
Warsaw Convention jurisprudence, allowing recovery for mental
injuries only if they are caused by bodily injuries.
VI. CONCLUSION
Developments in medical science likely will continue to im-
prove our understanding of PTSD and the nature of the psycho-
logical injury that produces related physical effects. In the
future, medical science also may be able to define the precise
mechanisms that produce these physical effects. However, the
Supreme Court in Floyd considered but rejected the idea that
270 Montreal Convention, supra note 4.
271 See text following Montreal Convention, supra note 4, at art. 57. Hosaka v.
United Airlines, 305 F.3d 989, 996 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2002).
272 Montreal Convention, supra note 4, at art. 17(1) explanatory note; see also
1999 U.S.T. LEXIS 175, at *12 (explaining that efforts were made in the negotia-
tions and drafting to retain existing language and substance of other provisions
to preserve judicial precedent relating to other aspects of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, in order to avoid unnecessary litigation over issues already decided by the
courts under the Warsaw Convention and its related protocols).
273 1999 U.S.T. LEXIS 175, at *12.
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modern medicine has obliterated the distinction between physi-
cal and mental injury.2 7 4 Legislative and judicial line-drawing
under the Warsaw Convention has maintained the traditional
mind-body distinction embodied in Western thought, despite
the considerable medical advances in this area.
The current state of the law after Saks, Floyd, and Tseng re-
quires that mental injuries must proximately flow from physical
injuries caused by an accident. This approach is consistent with
Floyd, yet provides full compensation for the victim within the
bounds established by the Warsaw Convention. Emotional inju-
ries unrelated to physical injuries or emotional injuries that are
manifested in physical symptoms are insufficient to trigger re-
covery under both the letter and spirit of Floyd. This approach
is also consistent with the dicta in Tseng that denies recovery for
psychic or psychosomatic injury.
27 5
The sweeping changes brought by the Montreal Convention
to passenger injury claims do not alter this conclusion. The
bodily injury requirement for recovery of damages under the
old Warsaw Convention standard is carried forward into the new
treaty's liability scheme. Article 17 of the Montreal Convention
uses the same "bodily injury" language as the English translation
of the Warsaw Convention, and the expressed intent of the U.S.
Senate in ratifying the Montreal Convention was to leave un-
274 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991). The respondent in the
F/oyd case specifically advanced the idea that there is no meaningful distinction
between the mind and body, a view rejected by the Supreme Court in its holding.
Brief for Respondent, E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd (1990) (No. 89-1598), 1990 W'VL
511332, at *5-6. The respondent argued, "ia]fter all, a mental injury is an injury
to the brain, and the brain is certainly an organ of the body." Id. There was a
time in the not so distant past of human evolution, of course, when the mind and
the body were considered to be separate and distinct entities. Modern scientific
developments have clearly put that mythic view of our being to rest, however.
And although the precise mechanisms of our thoughts and feelings remain
largely uncharted, there is general scientific agreement that the sophisticated
mental processes of our brain are, in actuality, mere physiological processes in-
volving electrical charges and chemical reactions. In short, "the current view of
the human life form is that anxiety, fear, mental anguish, psychic trauma and the
like [except where caused by innate physiological abnormality] are physiological
reactions to external stimuli - i.e., that a 'mental injury' is, in fact, a 'bodily in-
jury."' Id. at *6.
275 Tseng v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 155, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see
also Turturro v. Cont'l Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 176 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(quoting Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 156 (1996) to define psycho-
somatic as "1. of or pertaining to a physical disorder that is caused by or notably
influenced by emotional factors; and 2. pertaining to or involving both the mind
and the body."
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changed the judicial precedents interpreting Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention.27 a
276 Montreal Convention, supra note 4, at art 17(1) explanatory note. See also
1999 U.S.T. LEXIS 175, at *12.
